Battle of Bakhmut: “Depends on whether Russian side carries out a massacre”

Battle of Bakhmut
“Depends on whether the Russian side carries out a massacre”

03/15/2023, 08:19 am

In hardly any other city in Ukraine did Russian and Ukrainian soldiers shed as much blood as Bakhmut. Experts therefore doubt Zelenskyj’s strategy. Expert Gerhard Mangott explains in an interview why Kiev is still sticking to Bachmut, even though it is not decisive for the war.

ntv.de: The situation in Bachmut seems deadlocked. The city has been fiercely fought over for weeks, the Russian side is suffering high losses, but there are hardly any gains in territory. What does the city mean for the Russian and Ukrainian side respectively?

Gerhard Mangott: For the Russian side, conquering Bakhmut would be a symbolic victory. The first in many months. Conversely, that would also be a reason why Ukraine does not want to give up the city. She doesn’t want to begrudge the Russian side this symbolic success.

The second reason is that President Zelenskyi has proclaimed Bakhmut a fortress. As many Russian soldiers as possible should die there and as much Russian equipment as possible should be destroyed. That is the military logic behind this holding on to this city. However, this assumes that material and personnel losses are significantly higher on the Russian side than on the Ukrainian side. Otherwise this military logic would not work.

Selenskyj repeatedly warns that the Russians would have “free rein” if they gave up Bakhmut. The ISW doubts that. What is your assessment?

I doubt that either, because there are defense lines west of Bakhmut to which the Ukrainian army could retreat. Therefore, I am not convinced by the argument that if Russia captured Bakhmut, it could attack the defense centers in Sloviansk and Kramatorsk.

What is the risk of Ukrainian forces being surrounded?

So far, Russian forces have surrounded the city from the north, east and south. There is another connecting road in the west of the city, which is now used to bring material and soldiers to Bachmut and via which an eventual evacuation could take place. However, if this western road connection is either blocked by Russia or becomes so dangerous due to Russian artillery fire that it cannot be used without great risk, then the Ukrainian forces may well be trapped. Then it depends on whether the Russian side carries out a massacre or takes the soldiers as prisoners of war.

If one now compares the benefits and risks, is it wise to defend Bachmut at all costs?

There are obviously differences between the Ukrainian high command and the political leadership. There are rumors that the supreme commander has been recommending a withdrawal from Bakhmut for weeks because he no longer sees any military sense in it. But Zelenskyy refuses because he doesn’t want to begrudge the Russian side this symbolic success of the conquest. About ten days ago, Zelenskyi let the supreme commander say that he fully supported the further defense of Bakhmut and the dispatch of additional forces there. In reality, however, there is a difference here and politics is winning at the moment.

According to information from the Ukrainian military analyst Zhdanov, reservists who were trained in Western countries and are to be used for the counter-offensive were also sent to Bakhmut. Isn’t Ukraine hurting itself by doing this?

This can also be seen in the testimony of Lloyd Austin, the US Secretary of Defense. He said that if Bachmut fell, that would not be decisive for the war at all. In a way, this was a public recommendation to the Ukrainian political leadership to give up the city.

It is said that for every dead Ukrainian soldier there are at least five Russian ones. What’s the point of that statement?

These are Ukrainian claims that cannot be independently verified. There are also statements according to which the ratio is one to seven. However, there are reports from Russian military bloggers that the Wagner troops in Bakhmut may have lost up to 10,000 mercenaries. But these are not the Wagner elite soldiers, but mainly recruits called up from prisons at short notice who, with little combat experience, advance in ever new waves of crowds onto the defensive line, only to gain a few hundred meters each time.

What to expect from the planned Ukrainian counter-offensive?

Probably the most convincing version is that Ukraine is attacking in the Zaporizhia region and is trying to advance as far as Melitopol. If the course is optimal, they will advance to the shore of the Sea of ​​Azov, only to split the Russian-held territories in two, Donbass and Crimea, and what remains of the Kherson region, which Russia holds. That would also destroy the land bridge that Russia conquered last spring from Donbass to Crimea. That’s the most likely scenario. However, Ukraine will wait until it has a substantial number of capable western main battle tanks, at least six weeks.

In the scenario, Bakhmut would not have a major impact on the counteroffensive, nor on Russia’s offensive.

Whatever happens, it is simply not decisive for the war. Right now it’s just a city where a lot of people are dying. Bakhmut is a place of misery for the soldiers on both sides, with little military purpose. That is the bitterness of this situation.

Vivian Micks spoke to Gerhard Mangott